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that the expense of publication, an "auxiliary expense" (i.e., payable
by litigants to third persons other than public officers) was not contemplated by New York's comprehensive poor persons statutes.
In asserting that equal access to the civil courts was among the
fourteenth amendment's primary objectives, the court asserted that
the principles enunciated in Griffin v. Illinois"5 have equal validity in
civil cases:
[B]ecause the establishment of civil courts for enforcing claims and
vindicating legal rights is so fundamental, the State cannot close the
system to any person because of poverty.16
In Mrs. Jeffreys' situation, her very access to the courts for divorce
upon the grounds of abandonment was predicated upon her service
of summons by publication. Furthermore, since a marriage cannot be
dissolved except by "due judicial proceeding,"' 17 the courts provided
the only forum wherein relief might be obtained. The court therefore
required that the City of New York pay her publication costs so as to
afford her the access to the courts demanded by equal protection.
Consistent with its earlier opinion, the court indicated that applications for leave to serve a summons by publication under the poor
persons statutes must be made by notice to the City Treasurer within
8
New York City, and to the County Attorney outside the City.'
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CPLR 3101(d): Identity of witnesses learned subsequent to happening
of occurrence held to be materialpreparedfor litigation.
In Hartley v. Ring,19 the court took a major step in effectuating
the policy set forth in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.20 by
enunciating the following rule:
A party should disclose upon an examination before trial the names
of all witnesses observed by the party to be present at the scene of the
occurrence out of which the lawsuit arose or whose identity was
supplied to the party at the said scene. 21
15 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Griffin, after conviction, sought but was denied a free transcript
essential to access to the appellate courts. "Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts." Id.
at 19.
16 58 Misc. 2d at 1053, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
17 N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 9 (1954).
18 See Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 57 Misc. 2d 416, 292 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1968).

19 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
2021 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968). See also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice,43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 302, 324-25 (1968).
2158 Misc. 2d at 623, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, the names of witnesses were
not often the proper subject of disclosure. 22 However, two theories developed as exceptions to this rule. The first, originally expressed in
Pistanav. Pangborn,23 was to the effect that the identity of an "active
participant" in the occurrence was a proper subject for disclosure; and
the second, that where the party seeking disclosure was physically unable to obtain the names of witnesses while the other party was so able,
24
disclosure would be granted.
Since the enactment of the CPLR, the "active participantpassive observer" distinction has all but been obliterated. Where the
identity of a witness is gained through direct observation at the time
of the event, it should be subject to disclosure regardless of whether
the witness was a so-called participant or a passive observer.25
Nevertheless, there still remains some vestige of the pre-CPLR
rule in the area protected by CPLR 3101(d). The court in Hartley
stated that
where a party obtains knowledge of the identity of witnesses through
an investigation after the happening of the occurrence as distinguished
from personal observation at the scene, such knowledge constitutes
material prepared for litigation .... 26
In this respect the court is at odds with Professor Siegel, who maintains that a witness' name can never be "created" for the litigation,
and therefore, a fortiori, the names of all witnesses should be made
27
available through pre-trial disclosure.
While there is no possible rationale for the continuation of the
participant- non-participant distinction, arguments have been made
22 Id. at 620, 296 N.YS.2d at 395, and cases cited therein. See also 3 WEINSrEIN, KoaN
Nmw YoRK CiviL PaacrcE
3101.11 (1968).
23 2 App. Div. 2d 642, 151 N.Y.S.2d 742 (8d Dep't 1956).
24 Dickinson v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 57 Misc. 2d 991, 293 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1968); Maffeo v. Comtois, 55 Misc. 2d 779, 286 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1968). See also Lauren v. Gollin, 54 Misc. 2d 512, 282 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1967); Majchrzak v. Hagerty, 49 Misc. 2d 1027, 268 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1966); 7B McKXNNEY's CPLR 3101, supp. commentary 12 (1968).
25 Rivera v. Stewart, 51 Misc. 2d 647, 648, 273 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1966): "[1] am unable to see a valid distinction between . . . a person who assists
a fallen plaintiff to his feet and another who stands by watching." The Rivera rule permitting discovery of all persons at the scene of the accident has been followed in Sanfilipo
v. Baptist Temple, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 767, 276 N.Y.S.2d 936 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1967)
and in Dickinson v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 57 Misc. 2d 991, 992, 293 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1968): "This court subscribes to the view that the only legitimate objections to discovery of the names of the witnesses would be those found in CPLR 3101
subds. (c) [attorney's work product) and (d) [material prepared for litigation]". See also
3 VErNsrm, KoRN & MIL., NEw YORK CIVmL PRACrICE 3101.11 (1968).
26 58 Misc. 2d at 624, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
27 7B McKaiNEY's CPLR 3121, supp. commentary 13 (1968).
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that there is reason to allow a party to reap the fruits of its subsequent
investigation. 28 This, of course, is subject to the proviso in CPLR
3101(d) that the identification is immune from disclosure unless it cannot be duplicated and withholding it will result in undue hardship.
Hartley recognizes and perpetuates this dichotomy.
To reduce costly court battles and lengthy delays it would appear
that even this last vestige should also disappear. The advantages to be
gained by the policy of liberal disclosure far outweigh any contingent
detriment that might be experienced by allowing one party to profit
from the results of a subsequent investigation by his adversary. If the
end to be sought by the judicial process is justice in the abstract, then
complete disclosure is a means to that end. A self-serving refusal to
disclose the identity of hostile witnesses does not serve justice.
CPLR 3101(d): Conflict between departments over burden of proof
relating to material prepared for litigation.
In Dikun v. New York Central Railroad,29 a wrongful death action, plaintiff's motion to examine defendant's employee, a crew member of a train involved in an accident which gave rise to the cause of
action, was granted. Defendant sought to prevent the examination of
its employee by invoking CPLR 3101(d)(2) which provides that "any
writing or anything created by or for a party or his agent in preparation
of litigation" shall not be obtainable by the other party. 0 In the application of this section the courts are in general accord that "employee
statements made in the regular course of business stating what they
observed and did are not material prepared for litigation protected
81
from discovery by CPLR 3101(d)."
The party seeking to avoid disclosure has the burden of proving
that the material was prepared solely for litigation and not in the regular course of business- and that burden is not met by merely routing all material through an attorney. Divergent conclusions have been
drawn by the several departments as to how this burden may be met.
28 See, e.g., Rios v. Donovan, 21 App. Div. 2d 409, 413, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1st Dep't
1964): "While the policy of the CPLR is to broaden disclosure procedures, discovery should
not be permitted to substitute for independent investigation of facts which are equally

available to both parties." (Emphasis added.)
29 58 Misc. 2d 439, 295 N.YS.2d 830 (sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1968).
80 This prohibition against disclosure may only be invoked in the absence of the
court's finding that, because of a change in conditions, the material can no longer be
duplicated and to withhold it will result in injustice or undue hardship. CPLR 3101(d).
8158 Misc. 2d at 440, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 832, and cases cited therein. See also 3 WmNSTEM,
KoRN & MILLER, NEW YoRK CIviL PRAcricE

3101.50 (1968).

